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THEORY, SCIENCE, AND "MICRO-MACRO" BRIDGES  
IN STRUCTURAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
      Barry Markovsky 




Social psychology stands to benefit from multilevel theories that link  
it to both lower and higher levels of analysis. Making the link,  
however, requires a level of theoretical rigor heretofore relatively  
uncommon in the social sciences. After refuting several common  
objections to this brand of theorizing, I offer a rationale and a set  
of criteria for multilevel theory construction.  
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INTRODUCTION   
 
Several years ago, just before flying out to give a series of talks, I  
went to see a doctor. I had a lingering cold and wanted to see if  
there was any precaution--or drug--that I could take to prevent the  
changes in cabin pressure from making my head explode. The doctor  
asked where I was going and I responded, half facetiously, that I was  
going to give some talks on making sociology more scientific. He was  
surprised. He said, "I thought sociologists use a lot of statistics."  
I told him that they do, but that using statistics is not the same as  
being scientific. The key, I said, is how they state their claims and  
what they then do with those claims. In the 45 seconds he spent with  
me I could not really explore the idea. Consequently, I think he  
didn't really understand what I meant. But had he understood he might  
have been a better doctor, and my head would not have exploded during  
the plane's descent that evening.  
 
   In sociology and elsewhere, working in a scientific mode has little  
to do with the stereotypical trappings of science. Quantitative data  
analysis is not essential. Neither are laboratories, mathematical  
theories, journals or conferences--though all of these can be put to  
good use. If there is an essence to science, it lies in how we  
express our claims and in what happens to them as a result of that  
expression.  
 
   There is now an emerging body of perspectives and theories that  
some of us have dubbed "structural social psychology" (Lawler,  
Ridgeway and Markovsky 1993). It is bursting with potential, and will  
have some sort of a life span whether or not its proponents operate  
scientifically. Here, however, I will argue that the quality of that  
life will be compromised if we do not devote special attention to the  
expression of claims and to how those expressions are treated. In  
other words, the integrative, multilevel approach that is implied by  
the label "structural social psychology" is even more subject to  
pitfalls of pseudo-scientific temptations than less integrative,  




To anticipate some familiar criticisms, I want to first emphasize that  
it is neither arrogant nor fetishistic to argue this position. On the  
contrary, most sociologists who adopt scientifically rigorous methods  
tend to be very modest. They know that they cannot accept credit for  
inventing their approach and that their work is but a fine thread in  
a very broad fabric. Furthermore, it seems that some formal theorists  
become more concerned with building theoretical castles in the air  
than with explaining empirical phenomena. However, much too frequently 
we see reviewers and critics tarring any formal theory with this same  
brush, even those associated with long-standing programs of  
empirical research.  
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   Second, the position is not narrow. On the contrary, it is  
boundless. Narrowness would imply that it rules out too much. But  
what actually gets ruled out includes claims that cannot be tested;  
claims that can be tested, but have failed to survive empirical tests;  
and claims that contain self-contradictions, ambiguities, or invalid  
arguments. In short, we exclude the untestable, the false and the  
fuzzy. There are actually very few substantive interests in our field  
that are outside the realm of scientific inquiry. So the approach is  
not narrow in that sense.  
 
   The narrowness critique is also leveled at issues of argumentation.  
We hear that adopting rigorous theoretical language precludes  
important issues such as human reflexivity, capriciousness, and other  
ethereal qualities. This is patently false. Rigor only demands that  
the theorist states defining properties for concepts such as  
reflexivity and capriciousness and that he or she provides statements  
relating these terms to others in the theory. Also, if reflexivity  
and capriciousness do not matter for a particular theoretical  
purpose, then there is no obligation that they be in the theory, even  
if they happen to be universal human qualities.  
 
   Another facet of the narrowness critique is that scientific  
standards demand too much of sociological arguments, and thereby  
stifle them. This claim has a surface reasonableness until one  
examines it a little more closely. It suggests that lowered standards  
are justified because our subject matter is difficult. It is not easy  
to come up with really tight, solid theories, so we should settle for  
looser, feebler ones. It also suggests that we are justified in  
dissuading one another and our students from scrutinizing theories too  
carefully, that doing so shows a sort of fetish with form over content.  
But we must remember that, when the form is not there, neither is the  
content. If structural social psychologists want to adopt standards  
that allow or promote ambiguity of terms and invalidity of arguments,  
then they must be prepared to admit that they have no theoretical  
standards. As a group, we do not want this to occur because it will  
totally politicize the testing, acceptance and rejection of theories.  
 
   To deflect a third common criticism: all else being equal, rigorous  
arguments are not generally more difficult to understand than looser  
ones. I am baffled by those who assert that, by not defining their  
terms and by not subjecting their own arguments to logical analysis,  
they are somehow producing a work that is more easily communicated.  
If communicating a theory means getting others to share one's  
understanding of its terms, its claims and its consequences, then one  
must tell them what those terms mean and how to go about deriving the  
same conclusions. By not defining terms, one allows the uncritical  
consumer to experience a feeling of comprehension since the consumer  
has inferred his or her own meanings. These are unlikely to be the  
theorist's intended meanings, however, and so communication has not  
really taken place at all. 
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   Fourth, scientific theorizing is not mere rhetoric, any more than  
a book consists of mere letters on pages. Theories build codified  
systems of meaning. If those systems develop in conjunction with  
stringent testing, then they will have empirical import that reaches  
beyond unaided insights and intuitions.  
 
THEORY VS. QUASI-THEORY 
 
If structural social psychology develops in accord with other  
sociological sub-disciplines, then it will probably be long on quasi- 
theorizing and short on theory-building. By "quasi-theorizing" I mean  
efforts to develop perspectives, interpretive schemes, metatheories,  
agendas, and the like. I want to urge structural social psychologists  
to learn to distinguish these from a narrower, but more useful,  
definition of "theorizing" because there are some crucial differences:  
Unlike theories, quasi-theories are not held to any consistent set of  
communicative, logical, or empirical standards.  
 
   Quasi-theories best serve when they inspire us to theorize, but are  
pointless when mistaken for theories and debated as to their truthful- 
ness. Most of what is called sociological theorizing is debate over  
quasi-theories. As such, along with others in sociology and the other  
sciences, I think it is worth reserving the term "theory" for a more  
restricted class of objects, namely sets of logically related  
statements comprised of well-defined terms that survive harsh tests.  
 
QUALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THEORETICAL RIGOR 
 
Interestingly, despite all the talk for and against scientific  
theorizing in sociology, such theorizing is not so much an ideological 
starting point as it is the result of implementing a small set of  
conventions. Taken one at a time, those conventions are much  
less debatable and controversial than more diffuse questions about  
whether sociology can or should be scientific. These are summarized in  
Table 1, a list of eight desirable qualities for theories. I will  
briefly summarize them here, referring those who desire more detail to  
Cohen (1989).  
 
TABLE 1: GENERAL PROPERTIES OF THEORETICAL STATEMENTS  
 
 (1) free of contradiction 
 (2) free of ambivalence   
 (3) communicable 
 (4) abstract 
 (5) general 
 (6) precise 
 (7) parsimonious 
 (8) conditional 
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   (1) A theory containing a contradiction loses all explanatory power  
because any such argument is always logically false, whatever its  
content.  
 
   (2) Ambivalent statements such as "gender may affect attitudes" are  
ineffectual in theories because they are always logically true,  
regardless of content.  
 
   (3) Communicability requires theories to be accessible to  
interested others--adherents and skeptics alike--so that they can  
understand the theory well enough to submit it to stringent tests.  
 
   (4) Abstractness is the quality of not being bound to specific  
objects, times and places. Theories help to explain particulars, but  
also must transcend them. Abstract theories often contain terms unlike  
any used in everyday discourse. Though perhaps counterintuitive to  
some, this can be a great asset when the terms are well-chosen and  
sharply defined insofar as theories are supposed to provide insights  
which go beyond everyday points of view and familiar empirical  
instances.  
 
   (5) Theories are general to the extent that their statements are  
both interpretable and corroborated for a large number and variety of  
cases. The criterion of abstractness does not anchor the theory in  
empirical reality; the criterion of generality does. Interpretability  
thus requires the terms of the theory to be connected to many and  
varied empirical instances, whereas corroboration requires that the  
theoretical assertions built from those terms are verified through  
observation.  
 
   (6) Theories are precise to the degree that they generate accurate  
and detailed statements about phenomena.  
 
   (7) The criterion of parsimony demands that, all else being equal,  
smaller theories are preferred to larger ones. If Theory A can  
generate the same hypotheses as Theory B while employing fewer terms  
and fewer assumptions, then Theory A is preferred. Parsimony  
facilitates communicability and provides greater opportunity to  
explore logical entailments.  
 
   (8) Finally, Cohen (1989) cites three ways that theories are  
conditional: (i) They contain chains of logically related conditional  
statements that predicate the state or level of one concept on that of  
another. Without these types of statements there is nothing to test.  
(ii) Initial conditions[1] employ definitions of terms to bridge the  
theoretical and empirical realms, allowing us to derive hypotheses  
about real-world phenomena. (iii) Scope statements formulate domains  
within which hypotheses may be tested. Without them, a theorist is  
either deceiving herself or trying to deceive others as to the true  
generality of his or her theory.  
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   By offering these criteria, I am not implying that we must force  
ourselves to think in ways that avoid their violation or to avoid all  
forms of scholarly discourse that fail to measure up. Good theorizing  
may be born of illogical and ill-defined progenitors. The critical  
point is to know the difference.  
 
   A variety of methods satisfy the eight criteria. One need not  
decide upon a particular method of constructing theories. Rather, as  
one works with a theory, trying to balance such qualities as  
parsimony, generality and communicability, one finds oneself becoming  
interested in properties of the conceptual system and the logical  
structure of the arguments.  
 
   In general, these methods promote a kind of openness that, in turn,  
promote cumulative growth. When enough people in a field agree that  
it is the terms and relations of explicit theoretical statements that  
are to be the focus of debate and research, then it no longer matters  
who wrote them, what he or she "really" meant, or who believes that  
it does or does not matter. Egos are removed from the loop, and  
theoretical analysis and critique rise above latent or manifest  
meanness. It also relieves individuals of the burden of trying to  
convince others that they know a great deal, and focuses attention on  
what really matters: whether the theory explains what it is supposed  
to. To borrow an abstract and general notion of Shakespeare's, the  
theory's the thing.  
 
   Another reason for adhering to these criteria is avoiding the error  
of reification, a confusion of the symbolic elements of the theory  
with some "reality" to which it purportedly applies. Theoretical  
statements create a virtual reality, a system of idealized entities,  
relations and processes that possess only the properties assigned to  
them by the theorist, along with whatever consequences follow from  
those assignments. As such, the theory is a sort of artificial lens  
through which we may view certain phenomena and see things that we  
might not have otherwise. Problems arise when one assumes that the  
statements of a theory do more than this, that they are "descriptive"  
of empirical phenomena or can be used as "sensitizing" frameworks.  
Empirical description and creative interpretation are essential to  
the theory-building process. However, any conception of theories that  
permits them to possess these qualities will be a weak one. At  
minimum, the product sacrifices communicability, abstractness and  
generality. On the other hand, the theorist must build the virtual  
reality with some care, since all that s/he wishes to say with the  
theory, and none of what s/he wishes not to say, must be communicated  
to others. The benefit is protection against misinterpretations,  
misapplications, and inappropriate tests.  
 
                             [page 35]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 




For the present purposes, adopting norms of explicit and rigorous  
theorizing provide another important service: they facilitate  
multilevel theory-building. Beautiful and useful multilevel theories  
have developed in virtually all other scientific fields. Furthermore,  
current knowledge about social systems is comparable to pre- 
multilevel conceptions in these other fields: (1) A fair amount is  
known about the properties and behaviors of micro and macro level  
units; (2) there is some consensus among scholars with macro interests  
that, for certain problems, understanding micro foundations may be  
useful; and (3) many scholars with micro interests want to  
demonstrate the macro implications of their ideas. When cross-level  
connections are forged, complexities get bracketed and simplified,  
and new theoretical tasks are placed into clearer focus.  
 
   Sociology and social psychology have some superb multilevel  
theories with varying degrees of development and activity. Here I  
will mention just two areas, but note that there are several others.  
First, theories employing social network models are often among the  
most explicitly and naturally multilevel. They generally consider  
causal interactions bridging across structures, sub-structures,  
positions, and sometimes actors in positions. Ronald Burt's (1981)  
"Toward a Structural Theory of Social Action," James Coleman's (1990)  
"Foundations of Social Theory," and Thomas Fararo's (1989) "The  
Meaning of General Theoretical Sociology" are notably rigorous in  
their integration of models of the interests and judgments of humans  
in relational structures, organizations, stratification systems or  
institutions.  
 
   A second area showing multilevel theoretical activity was inspired  
by the so-called "problem of collective action": self-interested  
actors come to invest resources for collective goods rather than  
refusing to contribute and simply enjoying the benefits. This work  
has a strong multilevel flavor and fits squarely with the structural  
social psychology agenda. It is directed at explaining emergent group  
phenomena based on mutually contingent choices of actors in those  
groups. The most rigorous of this research uses computer simulations  
to express with precision its theoretical assumptions and to capture  
dynamics too complex for intuitive approaches. Theories of Oliver and  
Marwell (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985; Oliver and Marwell 1988a,  
1988b), Heckathorn (1988, 1989, 1990) and Macy (1990, 1991a, 1991b)  
are exemplary, and to varying degrees integrate network structural  
models.  
 
   Ironically, in the several volumes on micro-macro linkages in  
sociology that have appeared in the last decade, multilevel theories  
such as those noted above are scarcely cited. Most of the talk  
concerns strategies for theorizing rather than actual theorizing. For  
example, there is much debate about what conceptual linkages are  
best, without concomitant efforts to develop theories that utilize  
those concepts and linkages.  
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Having explored the concept of multilevel theories, let us now  
consider a set of general criteria for them. The actual criteria  
exist in set theoretic language (manuscript available from the  
author), but also lend themselves rather well to the less formal  
summarization below. In this scheme, multilevel theories extend  
unilevel theories, which, in turn, are aggregates of theoretical  
building blocks called "theory units." As shown in Table 2, a theory  
unit is a set with five elements, each of which is also a set:  
 
TABLE 2: THEORY UNIT 
 
 TU == {C, S, P}, where 
   C = theoretical concepts 
   S = scope statements 
   P = two conditional theoretical statements, e.g., "If x1, then y1" 
       and "If x2 then y2", logically linked so that y1 = x2.    
 
  Note: "==" indicates an "equivalence" relation 
 
Theoretical statements and scope statements consist of theoretical  
concepts and logical connectives. Some concepts are expressed as  
primitive (undefined) terms, and the rest are defined terms where  
definitions consist of primitive terms and/or previously defined  
terms. Logical connectives are defined outside of the theory, e.g.,  
through a particular mathematical branch. Theoretical statements 
are known by such labels as axioms, propositions, premises, or  
assumptions. In short, the TU is a knowledge generator, bringing  
together defined terms and logically connected statements in an  
explicit domain.  
 
   In turn, theories are comprised of interconnected TUs, those  
interconnections being defined by the criteria shown in Table 3.  
Simply stated, the TUs must overlap in their scope, language and  
logic.  
 
TABLE 3: CRITERIA FOR THEORIES 
 
Given more than one TU, a theory exists if and only if 
 
 (1) all have at least some shared S 
 (2) each has C shared with at least one other 
 (3) each logically connects with at least one other  
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Thus, theory units only combine to form a theory when they all have at  
least one scope statement in common. Otherwise, some theoretical  
statements would not be applicable under the same conditions for  
which other statements would apply. The second condition requires that  
every TU intersect with at least one other TU, thereby providing a  
conceptual "interface" through which TUs may inform one another. To  
then require logical connections among TUs means simply that each TU  
must have either an antecedent clause ("x" in "If x...") that also  
serves as a consequent ("y" in "...then y") in another TU, or the  
reverse. This permits TUs to be linked into longer chains of  
theoretical reasoning.  
 
   Multilevel theories (Table 4) require two further sets of criteria:  
 
TABLE 4: CRITERIA FOR MULTILEVEL THEORIES 
 
 (1) Containment Conditions 
    (a) there are statements at two or more levels of analysis 
    (b) units at higher levels contain units at lower levels 
    (c) a higher-level unit contains multiple lower-level units  
 
 (2) Bridging Conditions 
    (a) there is a conditional statement in which the level of the 
        antecedent differs from that of the consequent, or       
    (b) the subject of the higher-level statement is defined in terms 
        of the lower-level subject. 
 
Containment conditions ensure that there are at least two distinct  
units of analysis in the theory with multiple instances of one unit  
contained within single instances of the other. The latter condition  
both reflects the way multilevel theorizing is implemented in other  
sciences and rules out trivial cases of single-instance lower-level  
units, e.g., an army of one.  
 
   The bridging conditions allow two kinds of cross-level linkages.  
First, there may be a conditional statement that links two levels of  
analysis, e.g., "If actors make only short-run self-interested  
judgments, then the social system they comprise will disintegrate at  
an accelerating rate." Second, the link may be accomplished through a  
definition, e.g., "A class system exists if and only if socioeconomic  
strata form a transitive hierarchy."  
 
   Although it is not my purpose in this brief document to contrast  
the foregoing criteria with alternative formulations, it should be  
useful to draw a few comparisons with Coleman's (1987, 1990) popular  
argument for micro-macro linkage in sociology.  
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   Coleman's mission was to offer guidelines for explaining the  
relationship between a macro antecedent and a macro consequent by  
bridging to a micro level of analysis. This allows, for example, the  
explanation of the effects of Protestantism on capitalism by (1)  
bridging from Protestantism "down" to particular values held by  
individuals, (2) from those values "across" to certain individual  
economic behaviors, and then (3) "up" to capitalism. In Coleman's  
discussions, the "macro" always refers to a social system and the  
"micro" is always thought of as individual persons.  
 
   Coleman thus offered criteria (of a sort) for one kind of  
multilevel theory, a type that is and should be of great interest to  
many sociologists. In contrast to what I have offered, however, he did  
not set out to incorporate more fundamental criteria from the realm  
of theory construction, i.e., the semantic and logical requisites for  
well-formed theories, or the role to be played by scope conditions.  
Furthermore, he neither addressed nor ruled out alternative  
multilevel theoretical patterns which are explicitly permitted in my  
conceptualization. For example, a theory that only explains a micro  
process in terms of a macro condition could satisfy my criteria but  
not Coleman's. Importantly, in fact, much of what constitutes  
multilevel theorizing in other scientific disciplines would not  
conform to Coleman's specification. Finally, Coleman restricted his  
units of analysis to individual humans and to social systems. Again,  
while these units hold much interest for sociologists and others,  
they are not the only units that may be incorporated into multilevel  
social scientific theories. For example, Network Exchange Theory  
(Markovsky, Willer and Patton 1988; Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer and  
Markovsky 1995) simultaneously incorporates assumptions about  
individual judgments and actions, dyadic exchange conditions and  
processes, and social network configurations.  
 
STRUCTURAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EMERGING PSEUDO-SCIENCE? 
 
It will be tempting to not bother with criteria such as these. They  
require time and attention, and the payoffs in theory are largely  
unappreciated. By ignoring them, however, we can be assured that  
structural social psychology will come to manifest many of the  
hallmarks of pseudoscience (e.g., Radner and Radner 1982). For  
instance, with "research by exegesis," the words of esteemed others-- 
usually deceased--are taken as sage and beyond question. All that  
remains is to interpret specific cases in light of this received  
wisdom. Another hallmark is "looking for mysteries." For us, this  
means chasing after and trying to explain particular interesting  
phenomena in an ad hoc manner. Other markers of pseudoscience include  
a grab-bag use of evidence, offering irrefutable hypotheses,  
explanation by scenario, and refusal to revise in light of criticism.  
All of these warning signs are flashing in various corners of our  
discipline, sometimes near the center, too, and sometimes in bright  
colors and stunning combinations. We ought to avoid them, but we need  
to first educate ourselves about them.  
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CONCLUSION: THE EVOLUTION OF NEBULOUSNESS 
 
   To conclude, I would like to describe a process that I will call  
the evolution of nebulousness. Evolutionary epistemologists have  
likened theory growth to evolution by natural selection. Ideas,  
whatever their sources, are thrown into keen competition with one  
another. Survival depends on relative fitness, or resistance to  
empirical falsification. Natural selection is uncompromising. When one  
species is less fit than another, its environmental impact diminishes  
along with its members. Similarly, when a scientific collective is  
uncompromising in applying stringent theoretical criteria, unfit ideas  
diminish in their impact.  
 
   Whereas natural selection is a physical process, idea selection has  
a visible hand. The human factor comes into play, and the  
evolutionary epistemology can break down if left unattended. When the  
eight basic criteria are not collectively enforced, what evolves  
instead of knowledge is nebulousness, the progeny of which are unfit  
ideas kept alive by extraordinary means. The proponents of such ideas  
hide them behind perspectives, frameworks and metatheories, never  
really putting them to the test. They appear to live on--if one could  
call that living. But there is a stiff price paid in improvements  
forgone.  
 
   Astrologers are proud of the fact that their essential ideas have  
remained unchanged for around two millennia. As we know, however,  
their language of prediction excludes practically nothing, so the  
ideas do not improve. The field is stable not because it works so  
well, but because it is utterly stagnant.  
 
   Structural social psychology, with a domain and range that is  
perhaps broader than those of either sociology or social psychology,  
could be the astronomy of the social sciences. This can be  
accomplished without sacrificing any of our substantive interests-- 
families, emotions, personality, networks, perceptions, self, status,  
justice, power, etc. We must continually check the semantic and logical  
structures of our own theories and those of others, and we must train  
our students to do so as well. Further, we must lay bare the flaws that  
we discover and focus our attention on them, rather than trying to  
sweep them under the rug with irrelevant rhetoric. Yet, without a  
collective interest in upholding stringent criteria for the semantic  
and logical structures of our multilevel theories, structural social  
psychology will only be another in a series of social astrologies that  
have retreated into nebulousness or passed on with their founders.  
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[1] As pointed out by a reviewer, this is not the only meaning for the  
expression "initial condition." It is perhaps better known in the  
empirical sciences as the set of starting values for the parameters of  
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